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RECENT CASES
OIL AND GAS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-IMPLIED REPEAL OF STATUTE RESERVING MINERAL RIGHTS TO
COUNTIES.-During the 1941 session of the North Dakota Legislative
Assembly, a bill was enacted providing that fifty per cent of the mineral rights on any land obtained by any county under tax deed
proceedings would be retained by the county upon any future sale
of the land.' Two days later the Legislative Assembly passed a bill
providing that the county, upon the sale of any land acquired by it
through tax proceedings, was to furnish the purchaser with a deed
"conveying to him all right, title, and interest of the county in and
to such property."' These bills were subsequently incorporated into
the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, which was enacted in toto
by the Legislative Assembly. The bill providing for the fifty per cent
reservation became § 11-2704 and the bill providing for passage of
title became § 57-2815 of the Code. In 1945, the plaintiff obtained from
the defendant county deeds to two tracts of land he had purchased
from the county, the deeds containing no mineral reservations. The
plaintiff then brought an action to quiet title. Defendant county,
answering, asserted a claim to fifty per cent of the mineral rights in
the land. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the enactment of § 57-2815 two days after the passage of § 11-2704 had the
effect of repealing the latter statute by implication and that full title
to the mineral rights passed to the plaintiff on his purchase of the
land. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Kershaw v. Burleigh County,
47 N.W. 2d 132 (N.D.1951).
The instant case rests upon the authority of the decision in Adams
County v. Smith'. The Smith case was an attempt by Adams county
to share in the coal royalties received by a purchaser of county land
under a tax deed where the deed contained no reservation of mineral
rights. It was there held that § 11-2704, supra, was repealed by the
enactment of § 57-2815 supra, in so far as § 11-2704 purported to
reserve to the county fity per cent of the mineral rights. In reaching
its decision the court concluded that these two code provisions were
in irreconcilable conflict. The decision in the Smith case, based on
the premise that coal was a "mineral" within the terms of § 11-2704,
obviously foreshadowed the present result. A series of decisions,
which thus strip North Dakota counties of extremely valuable property rights which the legislature manifestly thought it was giving to
them clearly deserve careful scrutiny.
In dealing with problems of statutory construction, the courts
have enunciated from time to time a series of canons of construction
applicable to problems of the type here involved. The North Dakota
court has repeatedly stated,' in common with the great majority of
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N.D. Laws 1941, c. 136, N.D. Rev. Code § 11-2704 (1943): "Upon the
sale of any land by the county whether . . . acquired by tax proceedings,
deed, quit claim deed . . . there shall be reserved to the county transfer,
ring . . . fifty per cent of all oil, natural gas or minerals . . . on or underlying the land. Any transfer, deed, or lease which does not contain such
reservation shall be construed as if such reservation were contained therein ...
N.D. Laws 1941, c. 286, N.D. Rev. Code § 57-2815 (1943).
74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946).
The line of cases includes the instant decision, Adams County v. Smith,
supra, and Kopplin v. Burleigh County, 47 N.W.2d 137 (N.D. 1951).
E.g. State ex rel. Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835 (1918);
State cx rel. Kopriva v Larson, 48 N.D. 1144, 189 N.W. 626 (1922).
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other jurisdictions,' that repeals by implication are not favored by
, the law. The courts will, however, give effect to a legislative intention to implied repeal a prior enactment where that intention is clear
to the court,' even though the intention was not specifically stated.
This doctrine rests upon the principle that the latest expression of the
legislative will ought to control,' since a legislative body is presumed
to have intended to give effect to its own enactments.' The courts
indulge in the presumption that the progress of all measures through
the legislative mill and their final passage is accomplished with
deliberation and full knowledge of prior enactments." The intention
of the legislature is at all times said to govern.'1
Where, however, the legislative intent expresses itself in the form
of two irreconcilable statutes whose harmonization is impossible, the
later enactment is said to express the later intent of the legislature."
Upon this principle the doctrine of repeal by implication rests. To
determine whether a repeal by implication was intended the courts
look either to the terms of the later enactment itself" or the actual
intent which motivated the passage of the alleged repealing act." Out
of this search, it is said, an intent on the part of the legislature to
repeal by implication must clearly appear" and to be effective it must
'

United States v. Noce, 268 U.S. 613 (1925); Railroad Comm. v. Riley,

192 Cal. 54, 218 Pac. 415 (1923). Illustrative of cases where a particular
statute was held not to have effected a repeal by implication are Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); City of Tombstone v.
Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677 (1926).
State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
See Dougherty v. Joyce, 233 Mich. 619, 207 N.W. 863 (1926).
9

United States v. One Ford Automobile, 292 Fed. 207 (S.D.Tex.1923);

Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575, 28 N.E. 853 (1891)
overruled on other grounds in Lewisville Natural Gas Co. v. State, 135
Ind. 49, 34 N.E. 702 (1893); Kempien v. Board of Comm'rs of Ramsey
County, 160 Minn. 69, 199 N.W. 442 (1924).
0 This must, as the instant case demonstrates, be placed in the same category
with the presumption that a woman of ninety can have children and the
North Dakota rule that every collision between a train and livestock wandering on the track is presumptively due to the negligence of the railroad.
11 R. S. Blome Co. v. Ames, 365 Ill. 456, 6 N.E.2d 841 (1937); State ex
rel. Erickson v. Burr, 16 N.D. 581, 113 N.W. 705 (1907). But see Radin,
Statutory Construction, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870 (1930), in which it is
stated: "A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection
with words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable
number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority
might have had, and often demonstratably did have, different ideas and
beliefs." See also Mr. Justice Holmes' statement in Pine Hill Co. v. United
States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922): "It is a delicate business to base speculation about the purpose or construction of a statute upon the vicissitudes
of its passage."
22
Patchett v. Webber, 198 Cal. 440, 245 Pac. 422 (1926); First Nat. Bank
v. Lewis, 18 N.D. 390, 121 N.W. 836 (1909); Commonwealth ex rel.
Matthews v. Lomas, 302 Pa. 97, 153 Atl. 124 (1930).
"3
State ex rel. Shepard v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370, 111 Pac. 233
(1910). Cf. Leete v. Griswold Post No. 79, American Legion, 114 Conn.
400, 158 Atl. 919 (1932).
14 United States v. Yiginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921); Madison v. Southern
Wisconsin Ry., 156 Wis. 352; 146 N.W. 492 (1914), aff'd 240 U.S. 457
(1916).
"
State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., supra. See Adams County v. Smith, 74
N.D. 621, 627, 23 N.W.2d 873, 877 (1946).
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be either necessary" or follow as the only logical consequence because
of the language employed."
Thus, it is the intent of the legislature which is the cardinal
factor. However, there are many situations where the intent of the
legislature does not appear clearly. In such cases the result is often
arrived at through the strict application of the rules of statutory
construction. It is submitted, however, that such a mechanical application of the rules of statutory interpretation is unwise. Before the
court should hold legislation of the type found in the instant case
impliedly repealed, every effort should be made to reconcile the
legislative intent apparent on the face of the challenged legislation
with that apparent on the face of the alleged repealing statute, even
though in so doing the court might find it necessary to incorporate
the earlier into the later, thereby creating an exception. " This view
is expressed in McCain v. Farmers Electric Cooperative Corporation,'
and appears to have found general approval. Applied to the instant
case, such a rationale would indicate that § 11-2704 might well have
been read as an exception to the language of § 57-2815."' It is manifest
from a reading of the language of § 11-2704, which provides for the
construing of deeds which do not contain a reservation of mineral
rights as if such a reservation was included, that the legislature
foresaw situations where implied exceptions to deeds would be
necessary to preserve the rights of the counties."
A point made by the counsel for the defendant county in the
instant case deserves mention. After the original enactment of the
two measures involved in the case by the legislative assembly, their
provisions were incorporated into the codification of North Dakota
statutes adopted in 1943. It was argued that the later re-enactment
of the code containing these two sections wiped out the difference in
historical rank between them. It is submitted that the point is sound,
and that neither the location of a section in the code nor the date of
is Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Cope, 132 Okla. 152, 269 Pac. 1084 (1928);
State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 144 Wis.
386, 129 N.W. 623 (1911).
, Hudson v. State, 37 Okla.Crim.Rep. 290, 258 Pac. 352 (1927).
See cases cited Note 11, supra.
'9
McCain v. Farmers Electric Cooperative Corporation, 206 Ark. 15, 172
S.W.2d 933 (1943); Aday v. Chimes School Dist. No. 49, 209 Ark. 675,
191 S.W.2d 963 (1946). Cf. People v. Graves, 204 fI1. 20, 136 N.E. 542
(1922) (where the court states it would disregard priority of enactment
to give effect to the ascertained legislative intent).
206 Ark. 15, 172 S.W.2d 933 (1943).
21
Such a construction would also result in an exception to § 57-2816, N.D.
Rev. Code (1943), where the form of deed used by the county is set out.
The legislature seems to have intended this statute to be construed with
other similar legislation as is indicated by the use of the following language in § 11-2704: ". . . any transfer, deed, or lease which does not contain such reservation shall be construed as if such reservation were contained
therein."
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its enactment prior to codification should have legal effect." Particularly is this true where the statutes are incorporated into a statutory
compilation which is more than a mere collection of statutes but is
instead a revision of them, thus involving affirmative consideration
of the merits of the legislation contained in the enactment. However,
a majority of the courts have adopted a contrary view,"4 and in Hines
v. Harmon,' a case heavily relied upon by the court in the instant
decision, it was held that statutes brought into a revision do not have
an equal status because of their simultaneous passage.

La Ven C. Neff

WILLS-NO CONTEST CLAUSE-ACCELERATION OF REMAINDERS.-The will of testatrix left her estate in trust for the benefit
of defendant for life with remainder to defendant's children and in
default of issue of the defendant to the plaintiff if living, otherwise
to plaintiff's children. The plaintiff and defendant were the sole heirs
at law of the testatrix. Included in the will was a provision that any
person contesting the will was to receive one dollar in lieu of all
other provisions made by the will. Notwithstanding this provision
the defendant brought suit to contest the will and lost. The executors,
in filing their final account, petitioned the court to distribute the
estate to plaintiff on the ground that the defendant had forfeited her
life estate because of the contest, thus accelerating the 'plaintiff's
contingent remainder. The provision in favor of defendant's children,
it was argued, could never become operative because defendant was
incapable of having children by reason of a surgical operation. The
court held that by reason of the contest intestacy resulted as to the
life estate, but that the contingent remainder of the plaintiff could
not be accelerated so as to include in it the life estate; that the life
estate must be distributed according to the laws of intestacy; and that
defendant, as an heir at law, was entitled to one half of it. In re
LeFranc's Estate, 232 P.2d 4 (Cal.App.1951).
According to the overwhelming majority of American courts,
vested remainders, whether created by deed or by will, are acceler23

23
25

Cf. Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 278 Pac. 1002 (1929).
Hopkins v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.App. 133, 286 Pac. 1053 (1930);
Pedro v. Hapai, 28 Haw. 744 (1926).
178 Okla. 1, 61 P.2d 641 (1936,).

